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I got the Ollie No-orth
Bob Bo-ork
Bye, Bye, Bye Centennial Blues

But if the advocate and the judge know their jobs, what is the
constitutional scholar's role to be? In ideal terms, at least in the
ideal terms of my distinguished colleague, I suspect that the scholar
is seen as the only actor in the drama with the luxury of true neutrality. His or her role is thus that of the nagging conscience, to be
everything the judge is supposed to be in myth but can never be in
practice. If the legal system is to be kept honest the scholar must be
honest, and to be honest the scholar must be ruthlessly disciplined.
But if constitutional scholarship is not to be advocacy, what is
it to be? If one cares deeply about the central issues of American
life, and if one recognizes that judicial rulings in constitutional cases
profoundly affect that life, what is the constitutional scholar to do?
The advocate at least has a provisional anchor in the end he or
she seeks to accomplish, and the judge an anchor in the end that is
accomplished. The neutral scholar, however, must search for safe
moorings in some more transcendent fixture. But where? In logic?
In the constitutional text? In history? In the collective aspirations
of the people? Where am I supposed to find my discipline? What
discipline tells me what discipline means? To give up instrumentalism seems to threaten the one sure compass I have, what I feel in
my gut. Without it will scholarship be drained of force and meaning? Will I be yet another yuppie without a cause?
I got the Ed Meese, Warren Burger, Roscoe Pound,
Alexander Bickel, Gerald Gunther,
Larry Tribe, Fred Rodell, John Nowak, Ron Rotunda,
Mark Tushnet, Richard Posner, Vincent Blasi,
Henry Monaghan, Michael Perry, William Van Alstyne,
Dan Farber, David Bryden, Jesse Choper, John Hart Ely,
Bruce Ackerman, Richard Epstein, Ronald Dworkin,
John Rawls. Abe Lincoln. Herbert Wechsler,
Orval Faubus, Teddy Kennedy, Orrin Hatch.
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, William Rehnquist,
William Brennan, George Washington, Ronald Reagan
Ollie No-orth
Bob Bo-ork
Bye, Bye, Bye Centennial Blues!

DAVID M. O'BRIENzs
Two points about contemporary constitutional scholarship
strike me as worth making. First, it has become heavily normative
28.

Professor of History, University of Virginia.
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as well as marked by the proliferation of specialized theories of judicial review. As a result, we now face a kind of intellectual crisis.
Second, I find surprisingly lacking a certain kind of empirical scholarship, namely, that focusing on collegial courts and how the interaction-the political interaction-of Justices and judges determines
the course of adjudication and the direction of constitutional law.
As to the first point: obviously, American Legal Realism's triumph over Legal Formalism prepared the way for the development
of contemporary instrumentalist or result-oriented jurisprudence.
It did so by underscoring the significance of Justice Felix Frankfurter's observation that constitutional law "is not at all a science,
but applied politics." Karl Llewellyn, in particular, brought the insights claimed by legal realism to bear on constitutional interpretation when in 1934 he called for a jurisprudence of a "living
Constitution"-one, as he put it, "that can face fact, including that
fact, is what we need."
Since World War II, we have gotten more than Llewellyn, and
others, perhaps, bargained for. As the Supreme Court expanded
and espoused new constitutional doctrines and rights, liberal legal
academics churned out more and more specialized theories of constitutional interpretation. That appeared necessary not merely to
justify novel rulings, but to explain prior holdings and to offer
guidelines for later decisions, other courts, and legal development.
There were (and are) scholars wedded to one or another version of "interpretivism." This is particularly so for those trained at
the time when progressives attacked the conservative judicial activism that marched under the banner of Legal Formalism and who
favored the New Deal but found subsequent liberal judicial activism
deeply troubling. They still insist on "the reasoned elaboration of
judicial decisions" and decisions based on "neutral principles." But
some in that and the next generation, following Justice Stone's suggestion in footnote four of Carolene Products, also worked and reworked "process-oriented" theories of judicial review.
It was with the generations that came of age in the late 1950s,
1960s and early 1970s that liberal legal scholars emerged with even
more explicitly "noninterpretivist" theories. Accordingly, constitutional interpretation turned toward "abstract beliefs about morality
and justice," the teachings of natural law and human dignity, the
"voice of reason," "a moral patrimony" implicitly in "our common
heritage," "the circumstances and values of the present generation,"
"conventional morality," "public morality," "constitutional morality," "fundamental values," the "essential principles of justice," and
even the idea of progress.
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Alongside this dominant current of legal scholarship came not
only the Law and Economics School, but two other major intellectual forces. They have now so taken hold that they are likely to
prove major contenders in charting the course for scholarly debate
during the rest of this century.
Those identified with the Critical Legal Studies movement, on
the one hand, sharply debunk the increasingly idiosyncratic theories
of liberal legal scholarship. But beyond further broadening the
scope of legal scholarship (much as did the "Law and Society"
movement in the late 1960s and 1970s), this brand of scholarship
threatens to go deeper into theories of literary criticism and social
forces.
Liberal legalism confronts another, even greater challenge
from conservative legal scholars pushing a New Formalism. This
movement grew out of opposition to the "liberal jurisprudence" of
the Warren Court and the idea of a "living Constitution." And it
has moved far beyond Richard Nixon's clarion call for "strict constructionists." Already widely popularized and identified with Attorney General Edwin Meese's 1985 call for a "return to a
jurisprudence of original intentions," it undeniably has a stronghold
in law schools, with groups like the Federalist Society. And it has
an even stronger hold in the federal judiciary. While the likes of
Judge Robert H. Bork see themselves in the vanguard of this "great
intellectual struggle," the changing character of the entire federal
judiciary-due to President Ronald Reagan's naming of forty-five
to fifty percent of the bench before leaving the Oval Office-will
certainly affect the course of legal scholarship.
Law reviews already bear the weight of the growing debate
over a "jurisprudence of original intentions" and the New Legal
Formalism. Yet, just as agreement on increasingly abstract principles of liberal legalism proved elusive, the New Legal Formalism
and work-product of "originalist" judges, while providing much
grist for legal scholars, is likely to prove no less divisive. Nor is the
New Formalism any less normative than that of post-New Deal liberal legalism or the Old Legal Formalism that preceded it.
As for contemporary empirical research on collegial courtswhich was at the heart of public law scholarship (at least among
political scientists since the pioneering work of C. Herman Pritchett)-! am struck by the fact that it has gone in two directions.
There are notable quantitative studies of voting alignments, the
influence of and strategies for building voting blocs, and related
levels of agreement or disagreement in deciding cases and opinion
writing. Much of this research-incorporated now in law schools
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and reviews-has been directed at the Supreme Court, though there
have been some studies of lower federal appellate courts and state
supreme courts.
Unfortunately, most of this work is big on showing associational patterns and comparisons, but weak on detailed descriptions
and analysis of collegial interaction. In short, much more than
quantitative study of published opinions and docket books is
needed.
The kind of rich detail that we need on collegial interaction is
the promise of the second line of literature geared toward more ethnographic, even journalistic, description. It is exemplified by the
works of Alpheus T. Mason and Carl Swisher. One also thinks of
the many recent biographies of Justices Louis Brandeis, Felix
Frankfurter, and Frank Murphy, for example, or those of Judge
Frank Johnson and Learned Hand. The shortcoming of these
works is that the focus on individual judges-and their styles, approaches, and working relationships-often neglects collegial interaction. They nevertheless point toward a richer understanding of
courts, judges, and politics.
One exception in the domain of judicial biographies is Bernard
Schwartz's major work on the Warren Court, Super Chief Earl
Warren and His Supreme Court-A Judicial Biography. But alas
even this vividly descriptive book offers little in terms of advancing
conceptual understanding of collegial judicial decision making. And
it invariably fails to incorporate the concerns and discoveries of
those engaged in quantitative social science research.
All of this is by way of indicating that I think there is a surprising dearth of what I call-in expropriating John Schmidhauser's
words-"collective judicial biographies." That is to say, biographical studies whose chief concern is to explain the interpersonal relationships and interactions within collegial courts and which do so
by combining both quantitative description and detailed discussion
of intimate interactions, forces, and negotiations.
In other words, the two lines of empirical judicial studies need
to be brought together so that we begin to develop a comparative
literature of collective judicial biographies. That literature would
go beyond studies of the Supreme Court at different periodsmarked by different kinds of collegial interaction-to those of lower
federal appellate courts and state supreme courts, as well as perhaps
collegial courts abroad.
Such studies of "court-ways" would not only advance our understanding of collegial decisionmaking. They could also offer some
important findings for how we should think about courts and about
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possible, perhaps inexorable, changes in the structure of courts.
Specifically, studies of court-ways need to pay more attention to the
following:
1. The effects of the size of an appellate bench and how the
number and rotation of judges affect law and decisionmaking.
2. The housing and geographical location of appellate courts
as related to collegial interaction. One thinks, for example, of the
differences between the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and that for
the District of Columbia Circuit and how important those differences are for collegial decisionmaking.
3. The rise of what some judges lament as "bureaucratic
justice"-how the increase in the number of law clerks and staff
attorneys affects collegial decisionmaking, the traditional role of negotiation and compromise, and opinion writing.
4. Finally, a related issue, the consequences of introducing
modern office managerial practices and equipment during the last
ten to fifteen years. How are "court ways" changing due to the
greater reliance on modern office technology?
From my perspective as a political scientist, such empirical research deserves as much (if not more) attention as that presently
given to normative debates over theories of judicial review.
JOHN H. GARVEY29
1. It used to be that big shot legal academics wrote casebooks
and treatises when they tired of writing for the law reviews. They
now do books for university presses. There are many reasons for
this. Treatises are out of fashion because there is too much law and
it has lost its structure. Scholars are interested in either "deconstructing" or "rethinking" the law. Neither of these enterprises appeals to law firms, which buy a large fraction of the law reviews.
Such writers are also often big thinkers (like treatise writers in their
own way) and their oeuvre is too big for periodicals. Too, footnotes
are less important for deconstructors and rethinkers, and the law
reviews' addiction to them is annoying. (For shorter pieces such
people flee to Constitutional Commentary, Ethics, Nomos, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Social Philosophy & Policy, etc., where citation obligations are more relaxed.)
I have several reflections about this change in the form of
scholarship. One is that these books are hard for law library patrons to find. If I'm doing research on judicial review or equal protection I can't find books on the subject through the Index to Legal
29.

Wendell Cherry Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.

